Cinderella Seeks Shelter: Will the State, Church,or Civil Society Provide?

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In *Cinderella Goes to Market: Citizenship, Gender and Women's Movements in East Central Europe,*[1] Barbara Einhorn predicted a pronounced erosion of women's social rights during the transition from state socialism to market democracy because postcommunist regimes are under pressure to rapidly marketize their economies and pare back state entitlements. However, an exploration of the institutional terrain attempting to guarantee the social rights of women in postcommunist Poland reveals no significant change in the legal construction of women's roles. In fact, most of the legal framework surrounding marital and family law, separation, divorce, etc., has been utterly unaffected by "democratization." The main exception is in abortion law, which has become more restrictive not only in Poland, but in several Central and East European countries including the former East Germany, Slovakia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, and Slovenia.[2] Abortion has become increasingly available to women in Bulgaria and Romania during the postcommunist era[3] indicating that democratization has not uniformly expanded or contracted women's rights in all postcommunist countries. Rather, particular demographic and economic dilemmas as well as pressures from nationalist and feminist movements are influencing each country's legislation of policies that disproportionately affect women.

1. Barbara Einhorn, *Cinderella Goes To Market Citizenship, Gender and Women's Movements in East Central Europe* (London: Verso, 1993).
2. See Małgorzata Fuszara, "Abortion and the Formation of the Public Sphere in Poland"; Nanette Funk, "Abortion and German Unification"; Alena Heitlinger, "The Impact of the Transition from Communism on the Status of Women in the Czech and Slovak Republics"; and Slavenka Drakulić, "Women and the New Democracy in the Former Yugoslavia", in Nanette Funk and Magda Mueller, eds., *Gender Politics and Post-Communism: Reflections from Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union* (New York: Routledge, 1993).
3. See Mariana Hausleitner, "Women in Romania: Before and After the Collapse"; and Maria Todorova, "The Bulgarian Case: Women's Issues or Feminist Issues," in Funk and Mueller, *Gender Politics and Post-Communism.*

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Communist-era policy makers also legislated in response to demographic and economic pressures. Likewise, their political ideologies motivated them to construct women's rights in particular ways. Thus, rather than showing an erosion of social rights over the transition period, the data reveal that both state socialism and market democracy construct women's social citizenship similarly. At the same time, the expanded public discourse that has resulted from democratization allows for more explicit policy discussions and greater public awareness of many problems that disproportionately affect women. Domestic violence is one such case. In Poland today, the greater recognition of domestic violence as a pervasive social problem largely results from state efforts to raise public awareness. In this sense, contributions "from above" have clearly advanced the efforts of the Polish women's movement. However, I find efforts of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) "from below" provide the most meaningful opportunities for Polish women to assert their own legal identities and to liberate themselves from abusive relationships.

Einhorn asserted that the "revived civil society" these NGOs represent is the public space where new definitions of women's citizenship will be developed in Central Eastern Europe.[4] The general tenor of Einhorn's work, however, is pessimistic about this process. Generally, she describes a zero-sum game between the protection of the state (under state socialism) and the predation of the market (today). My research shows that the third sector[5] provides the institutional space for redefining women's social rights, challenging the legal status of women, and, most concretely, protecting women and their children from domestic abuse. The rub is that the groups that inhabit this space are not all feminist in nature, that is, their motivations are not uniformly to enhance women's autonomy and social status but to reify traditional notions of women's roles as mothers, wives, etc., and thereby to constrain their social and legal choices.

The system of third-sector/public-sector partnership that has

4. Einhorn, *Cinderella,* 260.
5. In invoking the term "third sector" I am referring to an organized civil society analytically distinct from the public sector (i.e., the state) and the private sector (i.e., the market or economy).

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emerged in postcommunist Poland is still developing as it has to recreate itself from locality to locality on an ad hoc basis. Further, while corporatist institutional arrangements have evolved in other areas of public policy (e.g., economic development, environmentalism), my research indicates that "women's issues" are not politically salient enough to motivate political elites to permanently institutionalize their mediation.

Finally, it is impossible to discuss women's social rights, family law, etc., in Poland without considering the role of the Catholic Church in constructing gender roles, patriarchal family relations, and so forth. My research shows that while the church is undeniably important in maintaining social and legal norms, it is not the church as a monolithic institution employing concerted strategies that limit women's social and legal choices. Rather, it is the actions of lay political actors who have internalized these norms and who translate these norms into public policy that define women's options.

Social Rights and Gender in Postcommunist Poland

In postcommunist Europe, the transition to a market-based economy has simultaneously exacerbated the financial problems of the publicly funded social-services sector and increased the demand for a wide variety of social services. Those who can afford it, simply leave the system by seeking services from private providers. At the same time, the economic hardship imposed upon a substantial segment of the population has made it impossible for the state to retreat from its commitment to provide universal access to health care and many other social welfare services. The Polish Constitution, ratified in 1997, states that citizens have a right to social security in times of sickness, injury, retirement, and unemployment (Article 67). State assistance is also guaranteed to families in difficult material situations, especially those with many children or with only one parent (Article 71). It also enumerated rights to health and to publicly funded health care (Article 68).

As in western contexts, women are more likely to become clients of the social welfare system due to their roles as caregivers, their greater vulnerability to unemployment, and their lower wages.

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Postcommunist social welfare systems have continued to emphasize women's dual roles as caregivers and workers by preserving rather extensive maternity leave policies and child benefit policies. In Poland, mothers are entitled to 16 weeks of paid maternity leave for a first child, 18 weeks for subsequent births, and 26 weeks for multiple births.[6] Women are also entitled to up to three years of unpaid leave to care for their own children, the children of their husbands, or foster children. Leave can be extended for mothers of chronically ill or disabled children.[7] At the end of such leaves, women are entitled to return to their positions or those of equal rank.[8] While these extended leaves are unpaid, women lacking adequate income support from husbands or family may apply for child benefits through the social security system. To qualify, family income cannot exceed 25 percent of the previous year's average monthly income earned in state-owned enterprises. Benefits are paid for two years, three in the case of multiple births.[9]

The "right" to combine the roles of caregiver and worker is available first and foremost to women in Poland. A father may apply for such leaves only if the mother has worked at least six months, specifically renounces her right to maternity leave, and designates the father as caregiver. If the mother quits her job, even to start her own business, the father loses all child benefits. Fathers enjoy the exclusive right to child-care leave only if the mother is deceased, seriously infirmed, or deprived of her parental rights through court order. Similarly, up to 60 days per year at full pay are granted to mothers to care for temporarily ill children. Men wishing to care for their sick children, on the other hand, earn only 80 percent of their salaries.[10]

Women in Poland are also entitled to retire five years earlier than men after 20 years of employment or at age 60 compared with 25 years of employment or age 65 for men. This is somewhat illogi-

6. "The Situation of Women in Poland" (Warsaw: Polish Committee of NGOs—Beijing 1995, 1995) 13.
7. "Situation of Women in Poland," 14.
8. "Situation of Women in Poland," 15.
9. "Situation of Women in Poland," 14.
10. "Situation of Women in Poland," 14–15.

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cal as women in the Central Eastern European region tend to live 5 to 10 years longer than men, implying they are actually more fit for employment in their sixties than are men. In Poland, the option of early retirement is more commonly treated as "mandatory" retirement for women at this age despite rulings from the Constitutional Tribunal against such practices.[11] The right to early retirement conveniently makes older women available to continue their care-giving roles as grandmothers.

The net effect of gendering social rights related to caregiving is to make women less attractive as employees because they are more costly relative to men.[12] As in the West, women have become the last hired and the first fired as postcommunist economies become more marketized. Because of the potential expense involved in hiring women workers who may go on maternity leave, some employers in Poland illegally require women to show medical documentation that they are not pregnant and/or require them to promise not to become pregnant for at least two years.[13] Einhorn shows that in all of the former state-socialist countries except Hungary women constitute 50–70 percent of the unemployed.[14] In 1985, 78 percent of Polish women were employed, compared to 71 percent in 1990, and only 57 percent in 1994.[15]

While women accounted in 54 percent of the unemployed in Poland in 1995, it is not the case that Polish women are less qualified than men. On the contrary, women with secondary or vocational education are twice as likely to be unemployed as men with similar educational qualifications.[16] Fong and Paul found that men in Central Eastern Europe have three times better a chance of finding new employment than women.[17] In sum, the legal construction of women as both caregivers and workers has served to

11. "Situation of Women in Poland," 15.
12. Einhorn, *Cinderella,* 9; "Situation of Women in Poland," 21.
13. "Situation of Women in Poland," 13.
14. Einhorn, *Cinderella,* 129.
15. "Situation of Women in Poland," 20.
16. Ibid.
17. Monika Fong and Gillian Paul, "The Changing Role of Women in Employment in Eastern Europe" (World Bank: Europe and Central Asia Region. Population and Human Resources Division., Report no. 8213, February 1992) 42.

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depress women's work-force participation by making staying at home a more attractive option, by setting up bureaucratic barriers to men's co-parenting, and by making it more expensive to employ women.

Thus, aside from their dual roles as caregivers and workers, women in postcommunist settings are more likely than men to have to "cash in" on their social rights because of their specific locations in the work-force. Economic restructuring has had a disproportionate impact on women in pink-collar administrative positions in social service agencies and state bureaucracies.[18] A study by the Polish Center for the Advancement of Women found that women over 40 employed in state-sector office jobs are at greatest risk of layoffs. The study also noted that this group is particularly difficult to re-employ because of overt gender and age discrimination as well as psychological barriers to retraining.[19]

Finally, there is increasing evidence of the feminization of poverty across postcommunist Europe due to lower wage earnings, lower pensions, increases in child-care costs and the rising incidence of women raising children alone.[20] Despite equal-pay-for-equal-work provisions in the Polish Constitution, women still earn less than men mainly as a result of occupational segregation. A 1979 executive order barring women from certain occupations is still in effect and, as a result, women's earnings are, on average, 30 percent lower than men's.[21]

While constitutional provisions may include equal rights regardless of gender and even endeavor to institutionalize positive discrimination for women, women in postcommunist contexts enjoy no more social equality than do western women. Socialism tended to prepare them for the least profitable and desirable positions in the post-1989 world—low-skilled industrial employment, professions in the low-paying education and health sectors or clerical jobs in state bureaucracies. Women participate in the work-force for less time and for less money, yielding them lower pensions and more economically precarious retirements.

18. Einhorn, *Cinderella,* 130.
19. Situation of Women in Poland," 21.
20. Einhorn, *Cinderella,* 137–139.
21. Situation of Women in Poland," 13.

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The Construction of Women's Social Rights

The combined effect of these policies and trends is that women are more dependent upon the state to provide for their social rights even as they are disadvantaged by them in the market. State-socialist and transitional regimes in Poland are nearly identical in their construction of women's social rights. Indeed, women are the very reason both types of regime stress social rights at all. Few male workers in full-employment socialism or hyperproductive, booming capitalism have need for social welfare provisions. Rather, it is women's biology, namely their ability to become pregnant and bear children, that demands the "extra" social dimension of citizenship, employment policies, etc. Thus, the construction of postcommunist women's social rights is intimately related to the construction of their identities as "citizens" who, first and foremost, serve society's reproductive needs and only secondarily contribute to production, public life, etc.

Family Law and Domestic Violence

Family law in postcommunist Poland has preserved both the *de jure* equality of women and men as well as *de facto* gender discrimination in its implementation. Article 23 of the Family and Guardianship Code states that married women and men have equal rights and obligations.[22] Either party may file for divorce but a court may deny granting divorce when it is ruled to be against the interests of juvenile children, the "principles of community life," or if sought exclusively by the spouse "guilty of breakdown of the marriage."[23] Thus, ultimate discretion lies with the court's determination of "the complete and irretrievable disintegration of matrimonial life ('physical, spiritual and economic')."[24]

De facto discrimination is evident in the way judges tend to interpret these statutes. Their interpretations are often shaded by Catholic and/or traditional beliefs about marriage. For example, judges have held a wife responsible for marital breakdown if she

22. Situation of Women in Poland," 16.
23. Situation of Women in Poland," 16.
24. Situation of Women in Poland," 16.

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has not kept house to her husband's liking or refused sexual relations with him.[25] Because there is no marital rape law in Poland, courts have also ruled against divorce in cases where sexual relations have continued against the wife's will.[26] Likewise, women are almost always awarded custody of the children, although men's rights to visitation and participation in important decisions affecting the children are generally established by the court.[27]

The report drafted by Poland's delegation to the United Nations' Conference on the Status of Women notes that divorce is most often sought by women (rather than men) in Poland, and that domestic violence is one of the main causes cited.[28] It is significant that the report singles out domestic violence as a cause for divorce as it cites no other frequent cause.

A study of domestic violence exposes the degree of social protection women are (not) provided by the state. It reveals how every facet of institutionalized state power—legal statutes, the courts, social welfare agencies—serve to construct women's social rights and status by defining what is and is not a crime, by making it more or less difficult to prosecute these crimes, to evict perpetrators and obtain restraining orders, to secure a divorce, and, perhaps most important, to receive the social, economic, and psychological services necessary to leave abusive relationships.

Scope of Domestic Violence in Poland

There is an old Polish adage asserting that "the peasant beats his wife to keep his liver from rotting."[29] However, Poland is not exceptional in this regard since physical abuse is often cited as "customary" among East European peasants. Because such abuse is seen as normal behavior, domestic violence is a taboo and often overlooked phenomenon.

The invisibility of domestic violence in such a culture led to a

25. Situation of Women in Poland," 17.
26. Ibid.
27. Urszula Nowakowska and Emilia Piwnik, "Women in the Family" in Urszula Nowakowska, ed., *Polish Women in the 90's* (Warsaw: Women's Rights Center, 2000), 125.
28. Nowakowska and Piwnik, 2000, "Women in the Family," 125.
29. In Polish, "*chłop żonę bije, żeby wątroba nie gnije.*"

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public information campaign called "The Blue Line" in 1997 to raise public awareness of the problem and to encourage battered women to seek help. The campaign is a joint effort between the Polish Ministry of Health and NGOs who have organized the information campaign and set up local confidential hotlines for victims. The hotlines provide information about where to receive legal advice, social services, and psychological support. In spring 1997, a Blue Line meeting organized by the president brought together NGO specialists and regional police chiefs from all over Poland to discuss ways to better train the police to deal with domestic violence calls.[30] An integral part of the campaign is the erection of graphic billboards showing women with black eyes and bruises underscored by slogans like "Because the soup was too salty." Such consciousness-raising campaigns represent a crucial role to be played by the state "from above" in fostering social dialogue, making abuse visible, and shattering taboos.

Statistics on domestic violence were not kept separately before 1995 indicating that Poland's state-socialist regimes tended to ignore such crimes. A subtle, seldom-articulated tenet of state socialism was that the exploitation of women and violence against them were endemic to capitalism. Such ills did not exist in socialist societies where women were emancipated, their roles as productive and reproductive laborers valued, and the absence of class conflict created social harmony.

Further, the "us-them" mentality that state socialism fostered between authorities and citizens made people even more unwilling to rely on state intervention into home life. Home and family life were idealized as one's escape from officialdom, propaganda, quotas, etc. It was the aspect of one's life to be kept safe from state scrutiny. Thus, it is not surprising that domestic violence generally went unreported, and official statistics were not deemed worth collecting.

Today, most specialists feel that domestic violence is a pathology that has increased since the transition to market democracy began in Poland. This is not surprising in light of the twin epidemics the transition has provoked: alcoholism and economic dis-

30. Interview with Jacek Lelonkiewicz, spring 1997.

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location. In 1995, Polish police responded to nearly one million domestic violence calls.[31] That year, ambulance workers reported that they had received nearly 4,000 domestic calls, and that alcohol was involved in two-thirds of them.[32]

A public opinion survey conducted by Poland's Center for Social Opinion Research (Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej [CBOS]) November 1996 found that 17 percent of married women had been struck by their husbands at least once—8 percent of these only once or twice, 5 percent up to a dozen times, and 4 percent many times.[33] These percentages were identical to those found in a similar study conducted by CBOS in 1993.[34] The most frequent victims of domestic violence were women in villages living in materially difficult circumstances. Nearly one-third of those married to unemployed men, for example, had been beaten between a few and a dozen times.[35] Among both the victims and the perpetrators, most had only primary educations, were employed as unskilled workers, or were unemployed. One-fifth of the perpetrators had only elementary educations (compared to only 6 percent who had higher education). Additionally, *half* of the respondents said they knew a woman who had been beaten by her husband.[36]

Women's Organizations and Activism from Below

The evidence shows that domestic violence is a serious and widespread problem in Poland, serious enough to warrant a national public awareness campaign and efforts to better prepare law enforcement officials for dealing with such calls. As Einhorn suggested, however, more than just such efforts "from above" are necessary. Community-based NGOs devoted to helping women escape abusive relationships are needed as are local governments interested in partnership with such groups. Two such partnerships

31. Katarzyna Montgomery, "Przemoc w rodzinie: Katalog spraw podnurych," *Gazeta Wyborcza,* 12–13 April 1997, 5.
32. Montgomery, "Przemoc w rodzinie," 5.
33. Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej, "Kobiety o konfliktach i przemocy w rodzinie" (Warszawa: CBOS, 1997), 4.
34. Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej, "Kobiety o konfliktach," 4.
35. Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej, "Kobiety o konfliktach," 5.
36. Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej, "Kobiety o konfliktach," 5.

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in Kraków and Łódź reveal how the organization of state power at the local level facilitates or impedes public-sector/third-sector partnership.

Kraków: Partnership Performance or Conservative Machine?

Unlike the corporatist[37] patterns observed in other issue areas, Kraków has not been very diligent about building discursive links between city government and women's organizations. On the contrary, it has been rather selective about the kind of NGOs with which it collaborates, choosing, in the area of social services, mainly groups affiliated with the Catholic Church. This clearly represents the overwhelmingly right-leaning political orientations of local politicians.[38] In economic and environmental issues, the fact that Kraków's city council is overwhelmingly drawn from the right of the political spectrum facilitates elite politics and al-

37. Corporatism is a form of institutionalized interest mediation. The term was coined initially to describe the inclusion of corporate and labor interests in policy-making in Western Europe. Over time, this model of inclusive policy-making was expanded to other types of issues and interests (e.g., farmers, environmentalists, retirees, etc.). In speaking of "corporatist solutions," I refer to institutionalized relations between the local state and NGOs representing a variety of "interests." For our purposes here, we are most concerned with how relations between the local state and women's organizations, especially those concerned with domestic violence, have or have not been institutionalized.

38. I am describing the composition of Kraków's second term council serving 1994–98. There are essentially three facets to Kraków's right. First, is the pro-business, center-right faction represented by the Your City councilors' club. This club, the majority partner in the second term's ruling coalition, comprised councilors from the Freedom Union party, the Kraków Industrial Society, the Industrial-Trade Chamber, and the Architects' Association. The junior partner in the coalition was the Self-Governing Kraków councilors club. Representing Kraków's Christian-nationalist right this club comprised councilors from a host of post-Solidarity parties such as the Kraków Self-Government League, NSZZ Solidarity, Individual Farmer's Solidarity, the Citizens' Committees of Kraków. The club's first programmatic statement in the city's 1994 yearbook was that the "actions of the Cracow [*sic*] authorities should be subordinate to family well-being" (*Rocznik miasta 1994 rok* [Kraków; 1995], 23). The third facet of Kraków's right was represented by the Right Together club, a Christian-conservative variety with strands of populism (e.g., the club claims to be for the operation of a free market but opposed raising the price of tram tickets, water and sewerage treatment) and comprises representatives from the Conservative party, the Union of Real Politics, and the Christian-National Union. The number of representatives from these clubs combined with the BBWR (The Nonpartisan Bloc Encouraging Reform) and independent rightist councilors means that the right held all but 18 of the 75 city councilor seats.

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lows for amicable, trusting political negotiations. It also indicates an absence of a well-organized, secular presence in city decision making. This is particularly true in social issues most affecting women and children since members of the Christian-nationalist right seek out seats on the Commission for Family Matters and Social Policy, which oversees many of the activities of the Department of Social Services. In 1997, seven commission members were drawn from the right, three from the center-right, and only three represented the left. The commission chairman and three others were from the Christian-nationalist "Self-Governing Kraków" making it the largest single faction on the commission. Thus, there is a strong, traditionally Catholic consensus on the commission and a definite absence of any secular, moderating influence.

The process of awarding the contract for running the city's shelter for victims of domestic violence lacked opportunities for cooperative dialogue and illuminated how Catholic values and Christian-nationalist political ideology influence policy decisions. We should recognize that there was not some kind of concerted, overt campaign organized by the church to change how the shelter was run, to inject Christian values into the provision of social services. Rather it was "street level Catholics"[39] in the city's Department of Social Services who sought out programmatic alternatives to the feminist, secular approaches of the Association for Crisis Intervention, the group that ran the shelter in the early nineties. The department contracts with numerous Catholic organizations especially in the area of what it calls Objective 12: "encouraging social activities in fulfilling the basic needs of people and families."[40] The main targets of aid under this objective are the unemployed, families in crisis, and families with pathologies as well as the elderly

39. Here, I am borrowing from Lipsky's term "street level bureaucrats." (Michael Lipsky, *Street-Level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the Individual in Public Services,* [New York, Russell Sage Foundation, 1980].) I imply that workers in Kraków's Department of Social Services have wide discretion as do Lipsky's New York human service workers. I became aware of connections between department workers and the church not only from reviewing the list of groups with whom the department interacts but also from other serendipitous events. For example, when one city administrator gave me his business card I noticed that he had stamped his city office information on the back of his business card for Radio Mariacki, the notoriously conservative, Catholic radio station.

40. Report, Kraków Department of Social Services, 1996, 14.

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and disabled. Local government, social organizations, charities, and churches are the intermediaries in these tasks. Of the 69 contracts awarded under the auspices of this objective in 1995, 29 went to Catholic organizations or parishes.[41] No other religious denomination was represented. Most of the Catholic groups were parishes or groups affiliated with the Brothers of Saint Albert.

The Department of Social Services has wide discretion in deciding with whom to contract for services, and the criteria informing the decisions are rather murky in the eyes of NGO activists. The case of awarding the contract to run the city's shelter for victims of domestic violence represents one particularly publicized case of confusion over these criteria. While the city pays for utilities and the upkeep of the building, it contracts with NGOs to provide for the women's meals, personal hygiene products, therapeutic and legal services. The first such contract was awarded to a group called the Association for Crisis Intervention. The group grew directly out of Kraków's intellectual oppositional[42] milieu—namely, women psychologists and lawyers—from the Workers Defense Committee (KOR).[43] In addition to funding from the city, the association was funded by the Stephen Batory Foundation, a western foundation promoting organized civil society in Central Eastern Europe, as well as the National Agency for the Resolution of Alcohol Problems.[44]

In the meantime, some of the women living in the shelter began

41. In Łódź, on the other hand, of the 64 social service groups the city cooperates with, only 6 are Catholic and one is Protestant according to a list provided by the Łódź Department of Citizens' Affairs. Thus, only 10 percent of Łódź's groups are religiously affiliated compared to 42 percent in Kraków.
42. In invoking the term "opposition" I am referring specifically to opposition to Poland's state-socialist regime organized in the 1970s and 1980s.
43. Interview with Anna Lipowska-Teutsch, one of the founders of the Association for Crisis Intervention, spring 1996. For those unfamiliar with Poland, the 1980s were a period of unprecedented oppositional activity. While most have probably heard of the Solidarity Trade Union, KOR was an intellectuals' organization that was organized to support Polish workers during the 1980 strikes. Most feel it was this cooperation between workers and intellectuals that made Solidarity a unique and powerful force in pre-1989 Eastern Europe.
44. Apparently there were a few problems at the shelter during the association's tenure but one gets a different story depending upon whom one asks about how the group fell out of favor with city officials. One senior administrator characterized the situation as one where the group "had lost control" of goings-on at the shelter, particularly after hours. Lipowska-Teutsch has a different story. She said that the association needed help in feeding the women at the shelter and that the Dar Zycia Foundation,

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to organize themselves and formed the group Women Against Violence. They obtained a $25,000 grant from the Batory Foundation to transport and accompany women to court. When the term of the Association for Crisis Intervention's contract expired, Women Against Violence put together a proposal to take over the shelter with the assistance of four other women's organizations.[45] In the first round of bidding, only Women Against Violence's proposal was put forward so the round was invalidated. In the second round, the Department of Social Services *solicited* bids from four other organizations: the Association for Crisis Intervention; the Polish Red Cross; and two Catholic organizations—the Kraków archdiocese's branch of Caritas; and Nadzieja (Hope). These last two organizations are the local chapters of international or national Catholic charitable organizations with no particular expertise in treating abused women. The Association for Crisis Intervention, unhappy about its previous interactions with the Department of Social Services, did not bid. In a seeming attempt at subterfuge, the city department changed the deadline for submitting proposals and accepted Caritas's bid although it was the only association to submit one.[46] This procedure was invalidated by the City Council's Bureau of Control. In the next and final round, Caritas was awarded the contract.

Lipowska-Teutsch, as well as Małgorzata Korczyńska, president of Women Against Violence, was disgusted by this process and the behavior of the Department of Social Services.[47]

> It is an extremely difficult method of making decisions. The criteria are not clear. I mean, until it's over you have no idea what

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a charitable organization affiliated with the Hari Krishna movement, offered to provide food service to the shelter. The Department of Social Services frowned upon the idea of allowing the Krishnas to provide the food service. Members of the Association for Crisis Intervention, however, decided that such activity did not violate their contract with the city and, faced with 30 hungry women and their children, allowed the Krishnas to provide the food.

45. According to Lipowska-Teutsch, the program met all of the guidelines issued by the Polish Plenipotentiary for Women and Family and widely recognized standards set by the United Nations. She said the proposal was also very competitive from a financial point of view in that 45 percent of the costs were to be covered by the organizations.
46. Interviews with Malgorzata Korczyńska, president of Women Against Violence, and Lipowska-Teutsch.
47. Interview with Lipowska-Teutsch.

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> influences the decision of the competition committee. And, relatedly, there is a large risk of arbitrary decisions based on various non-meritocratous factors. There is no means of controlling it.[48]

Lipowska-Teutsch feels that the bidding situation in Kraków reflected the predicament of NGOs all over Poland. It showed that even in a city committed to pursuing good administration and open government, "there is no chance for (NGOs) to be equal ranking partners with public administration."

This is especially true in that the city is under no legal obligation to solicit bids in the future. Rather, the contract is merely reawarded as an "annex" to the existing contract, effectively preventing Women Against Violence or any other group from wresting control of the shelter away from Caritas. When asked why the city chose to contract with Caritas over other organizations participating in the second round of bidding, Janina Bojda, director of Kraków's Department of Social Services said the decision was based on "programmatic reasons."[49] According to national media[50] and others interviewed for this project, the main programmatic difference between the Caritas program and those of Women Against Violence or the Association for Crisis Intervention is that Caritas stressed reintegrating the family whenever possible. This interpretation is supported by Małgorzata Fowicz-Śliwińska, the current director of the shelter:

> If there is from both sides a flash of will that they want to talk, to communicate, then that is the role of the psychologist: to correct that communication between them because sometimes it happens, there are instances where the families agree because it turns out that this conflict is only a matter of not talking it out.[51]

Additionally, there are accusations from some of the other organizations involved that there are, in fact, very few professionals (i.e., psychologists, lawyers) involved with the shelter under Caritas's management. Rather, they suggest that the majority of people with whom the women have contact are Catholic priests or nuns.

48. Ibid., spring 1996.
49. Interview with Janina Bojda, spring 1996.
50. Ewa Nowakowska, "Baby do bicia," *Polityka,* No. 9 (2026), March 2, 1996: 84.
51. Interview with Małgorzata Fowicz-Śliwińska, spring 1997.

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This is not the way the shelter activities were portrayed by its director, Fowicz-Śliwińska. She described the shelter as being primarily financed by the city's Department of Social Aid (Miejski Ośrodek Pomoc Społecznej) with the Catholic charity Caritas providing meals and many household items (laundry and dish detergents, etc.). She said that psychologists (on staff full time at the shelter) do a complete diagnosis of each woman and her children, and create a short-term crisis therapy plan. The psychologist may also accompany the woman to court. She also described mediation as part of the shelter's menu of treatment options, wherein the psychologist orchestrates meetings between the woman, her children and "the husband" [*sic*].[52]

The director does not deny, therefore, that it is not uncommon to bring together victims and perpetrators of domestic violence in the shelter. Nor does she deny the important role that Caritas plays in meeting the women and children's daily needs. In her opinion, however, the women are receiving the kind and the level of services they need to overcome their "crises" and to heal their families, where possible. Rather than seeing violence as an act that irrevocably ruptures a relationship or as a pattern of behavior impossible to reverse, the shelter emphasizes maintaining the family unit and attempting to change its patterns of conflict resolution.

This approach is simply unacceptable to many in the domestic violence community who feel that it is rare that an abuser "unlearns" violent behaviors. This difference of opinion regarding treatment options is aggravated in the Polish case by a strong division running through Polish society between secularists and Catholics. Integrative therapy is viewed by secularists as a deliberate, church-driven policy to put the inviolability of the family above the rights of women and children to be free from harm within their own homes.

State Discretion in Choosing NGO Partners

Kraków's performance in women's issues was impaired by policy choices not characteristic of decision making in other issue areas.

52. Ibid.

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First, Kraków city officials deliberately chose to collaborate with a Catholic agency without particular expertise in treating the problems of women in abusive relationships and did not seek to develop or perpetuate relationships with other groups specifically devoted to women. In other words, the city chose not to exploit an important third-sector resource—the expertise of feminist organizations[53]—choosing instead to tap into the "expertise" of only one type of organization: socially conservative, Catholic charities. As a result, victims of domestic violence in Kraków must rely on the therapeutic and legal services of professionals who tend to privilege the inviolability of the family unit.

More important, the resources of more explicitly feminist organizations are now being wasted trying to circumvent the city-endorsed programs. The Women's Foundation, a "new social movement"[54] type of feminist organization, has committed itself to never sending women to the city-run shelter. If a woman involved in an abusive relationship contacts the foundation, it assists her in any way possible. At times this has meant paying for the women to stay at a hotel for a few days until a longer-term solution could be found. In fact, an informal, almost underground

53. In 1996, at least 14 organizations in Kraków devoted attention to women's issues. These ranged from women's section of unions and parties, associations for professional women, and charitable organizations to women's clubs with broad missions. In addition to the city shelter, the vovoidship (provincial government) also runs a crisis intervention center although it has only three rooms for ovemight stays and these stays are only meant to last a day or two. There are four other Catholic foundations devoted to helping women with children or in crisis pregnancies. Equally prevalent are groups devoted to retraining women for new job opportunities, helping women entrepreneurs network, etc. There is only one organization, of the "new social movement" variety, that is, an overtly feminist group that seeks fundamental changes in attitudes toward women and gender roles, publishes feminist literature, etc. This group, the Women's Foundation (eFKa) also engages in occasional protest activities, runs computer literacy courses for women, and staffs a hotline for women with questions about any subject, women in crisis, etc. It assists women in abusive relationships on an ad hoc basis.

54. New social movements are distinguishable from older movements in that they are oriented around issues of identity, cultural and self-expression, life-style and alternative forms of political action. Commonly cited new social movements are third-wave feminism, gay and lesbian movements, and environmental movements. In terms of women's movements, third-wave feminism is properly characterized as a new social movement because it addresses the gendered nature of power in all spheres of public and private life (i.e., public and private gender identities, how gender mediates expression, lifestyle choices, and forms of political action). First-wave feminism, on the other hand, was mainly concerned with issues of women's formal, i.e., legal, equality (voting rights, equal opportunity in education, and work, etc.).

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arrangement has evolved between the foundation and (ironically) a particular order of nuns[55] in Kraków who have agreed to shelter women and their children in secrecy while professional women from the foundation serve as the women's advocates in pursuing criminal charges, eviction, divorce, finding a job, etc..[56]

The decision to award the contract to Caritas resulted from bureaucratic processes rather than the more corporatist, discursive policy-generating processes common in Kraków in other issue areas (namely, in historic preservation, city planning, and environmental issues).[57] This impairs Kraków's performance in women's issues across the board because Kraków's feminist community saw the process as unjust and religiously motivated, thereby coloring any future collaboration with distrust toward city officials. Thus, future efforts at cooperation have been jeopardized by these events. For Kraków to improve its performance in social services and other issues that affect women, the city must now invest its resources in building trust with these groups anew. The efforts of the new NGO ombudsman to standardize procedures, make criteria more explicit, etc., are steps toward rebuilding the city's performance in this issue area.

History, Identity, the State, and Institutional Capital

The liberal intellectual and student oppositional milieus were important in building a third sector devoted to women's issues in Kraków. Intellectuals and professionals from Jagiellonian University, many of whom were student leaders in the seventies and eighties, were instrumental in starting both the Association for Crisis Intervention and the regional-level Crisis Intervention Center. Women activists from the student environmental movement in the 1980s established the Women's Foundation, using the organizing skills they learned in the 1980s opposition movements

55. In this instance, one element of the institutional infrastructure of the church has actually been subverted for feminist intent!
56. Interview with Stanisława Walczewska, spring 1997.
57. Laura Brunell, "Embedding Post-Communist Regimes: Urban Governance and Institutional Capital in Post-Communist Poland" (Ph.d. diss., Boulder, University of Colorado, 1999).

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to organize decidedly feminist organizations in the 1990s. These women expressed that their experiences with these oppositional milieus forged a distinctly feminist identity that became the basis of their new organizations. Kraków city elites have not been interested, however, in building institutionalized, discursive ties with these organizations. As a result, many of these groups have abandoned local politics and policies, focusing instead on "outsider" strategies (e.g., protest, creating alternatives to public policy, and developing organizational linkages with feminist organizations in Warsaw and the West). Thus, women's organizations in Kraków offer a clear example of how particular bottom-up organizing experiences often do not lead to fruitful partnership with the state, instead spending their precious resources to *circumvent the state.*

Gendered Constructions of Citizenship

The events surrounding the women's shelter in Kraków also show how the locality, by virtue of its responsibilities for providing social services, actively constructs women's identities and the content of their citizenship. Conservative, Catholic politicians and bureaucrats in Kraków, *more than any organized mobilization on the part of the church,* create social welfare policies that support Catholic dogma about the sanctity of the family unit and venerate women who stay in abusive relationships and preserve their traditional roles as mothers and wives. Their influence in the post-communist period was foreshadowed by the strength and prominence of church-based activism in Kraków during the 1980s.[58] The tendency is to think of such church-based activism as orchestrated "from above," as in Cardinal Wojtyla's "allowing" Kraków's churches to be used for lectures by the Flying University. In reality, however, the day-to-day activities of individual Catholic intellectuals and parishioners gave this element of the Solidarity movement its enormous strength. It is the diffuse work of such ordinary people today that injects a decidedly Catholic morality into Polish politics.

58. Brunell, Embedding Post-communist Regimes.

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Sheltering Women in Łódź

How does the quality and range of services available to victims of domestic violence in Łódź compare to the services in Kraków?

Within the 1994–98 Łódź city council, neither the left, right, nor center had a clear majority and all three factions tended to compete rather than cooperate with one another. Because city politicians are so preoccupied with political struggles, social service provision remained rather depoliticized. A few of the comments from the city's Executive Board meeting discussing whether the city should systematize its cooperation with NGOs are revealing. First, there was open acknowledgment of the possibility for political conflict in formalizing the relationship between the city and NGOs. Mayor Marek Czekalski "warned of the danger of using NGOs for political fighting."[59] Board member Paweł Pawlak, likewise, distinguished between two types of groups—those that exist to support the city or fulfill its activities as its agent, and those who *contest it.*[60] Finally, Deputy Director of the Department of Public Health Krzysztof Tronczyński warned that funding often goes directly "into the hands" of the NGOs. He warned that if the situation were not policed, "mistakes" (read: corruption) could occur. The mayor's press secretary, Witold Rosset, had a similar view:

> The majority of organizations, upon whom the municipality relies the heaviest, are those devoted to charitable activity, most frequently in the areas of health care and social care . . . They often carry out tasks that have to be performed by the municipality. The proposed form of cooperation with these groups will allow the exposure of the best and also the avoidance of mistakes with financing organizations that shouldn't be.[61]

The notable thing about these comments is that they tend either to view cooperation with NGOs as a way to protect the city from blame or to warn against the potential for abuse of the system by political interests. To be fair, it could be that more skeptical views arose because this was a meeting about whether to undertake a new and unknown form of cooperation with NGOs. The com-

59. Minutes from the 23 January 1997 Executive Board Meeting.
60. Minutes, 23 January 1997.
61. Minutes, 23 January 1997.

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ments are revealing, however, in that they say almost nothing about such cooperation being an absolute good for democracy or mean of enabling city goals. Tronczyński, for one, offered the economist's view that such cooperation could save the city money in that every zloty spent on an NGO was worth three in direct city efforts.[62]

Thus, the politicians' views about cooperation with NGOs seem to bear out the views of Jacek Lelonkiewicz, the director of the women's shelter, and Elżbieta Hibner, a former executive board member.[63] Both asserted that the city is not particularly interested in cooperating with NGOs and that rather than seeing some value in such activities, officials are more often skeptical about cooperation. This very skepticism allowed others in the Department of Social Services to develop positive if informal connections with third-sector organizations, away from the harsh ideological light that normally glares on policy making in Łódź. Further, despite the "on the record" skepticism about funding NGOs, the Łódź city budget is peppered with expenditures to third-sector organizations, generally without any project- or grant-specific information. It appears that nearly every city department is allotted a pool of money to be spent on community groups, associations and the like at the discretion of the department. In the absence of information describing the specific purposes of these funds and in conjunction with my careful observation of Łódź politics over time, the most viable explanation of these funds' purposes is political patronage.

The resulting web of diffuse relationships that exists among city and national political elites, bureaucrats, and women's organizations allows Łódź to provide wide-ranging, professional social services without becoming overly reliant on church-based organizations. These connections, some of them forms of political patronage, allow funding and political clout from the national government to be pooled with city-controlled resources (namely, the reach of its bureaucratic apparatus and control over city and neighborhood-level social services) and those controlled by a variety

62. Minutes, 23 January 1997.
63. Interviews, spring 1997.

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of third-sector organizations—some affiliated with the church, some post-1990 feminist groups, and some descendants of quasi-public charities[64] that existed under state socialism.

Both formal and informal links have developed between a range of women's service organizations and the city's Department of Social Services. Rather than there being a decided preference for Catholic organizations (or Catholic organizations being so numerous and strongly organized, as in Kraków), in Łódź only 10 percent of the groups cooperating with the city are religiously affiliated.[65] As a result, street-level bureaucrats in the Department of Social Services refer citizens to a wider ideological range of organizations with a much larger secular base.

This pattern of cooperation grows out of Łódź's more diverse ideological composition especially its tradition of having an organized, secular left.[66] After the first local elections in 1990, there was not a wholesale shift in city policies away from pre-existing, officially recognized organizations and charities in favor of Solidarity-based, church-affiliated, or wholly new organizations. Rather pre-existing institutional connections between city offices and quasi-public[67] organizations were maintained. While many of

64. In the literature on NGOs, a number of related acronyms have grown up to describe third-sector organizations that are not purely voluntary in origin but that are essentially organized upon the initiative or explicit endorsement of the state. The most common acronyms for these groups are GONGO (government-organized NGO) and QUANGO (quasi-NGO). So prominent are these groups in the post-Thatcherite United Kingdom that many Britons now refer to their government as a "quangocracy." A substantial portion of postcommunist civil society can also be dubbed GONGOs or QUANGOs, GONGOs being NGOs set up by governments (national, regional, or local) to stimulate or stand in for third-sector activity. Examples in this category are the Regional Centers for Environmental Education in both Łódź and Kraków or the National Foundation for Environmental Education. In the postcommunist third-sector landscape, one also encounters many QUANGOs especially organizations recognized (or set up) by state-socialist regimes. Examples of these are the Association of Polish Writers or the Association of Children's Friends. The quasi-public charities I refer to above are in the QUANGO category.
65. Of these, six are Catholic and one is Protestant in affiliation.
66. Some familiar with Łódź politics may object to my characterization of the city as secular because Łódź was notable in the early nineties for having a fairly strong Christian-nationalist faction of Solidarity—one that went on to win the first local elections and become the senior partner in the city's governing coalition. Over the course of the nineties, however, this faction lost control of the city to the left, that is, the postcommunist SLD (Alliance of the Democratic Left), and Łódź voters voted more and more strongly for the SLD in city, parliamentary and presidential elections during this period.
67. See note 13.

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these organizations no longer receive public funding, they are institutionalized and important elements of Łódź's postcommunist third sector.

In fact, these formerly officially recognized organizations make up a much larger part of Łódź's postcommunist, third-sector landscape relative to Kraków's. Of the 15 organizations in my Łódź sample that existed before 1990, 12 were officially organized or recognized groups while only three[68] were alternative or oppositional groups. In fact, these formerly officially recognized organizations constitute fully 30 percent of my NGO sample in Łódź. In contrast, only 13 percent of Kraków's pre-existing organizations comprised such groups while nine of the 15 groups had alternative or oppositional roots.

These groups are of concern here insofar as they provide different types of partners and different resources for the city for governing in the area of social services. Because Łódź's third sector is comparatively less robust than Kraków's, institutional ties between the local state and existing organizations are all the more important. They contribute to the city's governance by providing a somewhat centralized network of organizations fanning out all over the city and across segments of the population (women, children, seniors, etc.).

Alongside these pre-existing organizations are groups that have sprung up during the 1990s. Many of these, especially in women's issues, enjoy the patronage of politicians representing Łódź in national-level politics. The International Women's Foundation was founded by Senator Zdzisława Jankowska, while the Work and Home Association was founded by Sejm representative Iwona Sledzińska-Katarasińska. Their patronage is important to these organizations in several ways. First, they give the groups a higher profile and the respect of policy makers and citizens. Second, they provide other resources to the groups such as their leadership, office space, and paid staff not to mention occasional direct funding from national programs and ministries.

68. These are Regional Solidarity, the Łódź University of the Third Age, and Chiron-An Association for the Development of Unconventional Knowledge in Connection with Modern Science.

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While the International Women's Foundation exists specifically to retrain unemployed women, the Work and Home Association has fighting violence against women as one of its goals. City social workers refer women in crisis to the group for legal assistance, counseling and so forth.[69]

Łódź does not officially maintain a shelter for victims of domestic violence.[70] If one asks women's organizations or city officials at the Department of Social Services about such services, one will be referred to the Hostel for Mothers and Children Protecting Themselves against Violence run by Jacek Lelonkiewicz.[71] While the group does not have a formal, exclusive contract with the city, a continuous, if somewhat informal relationship has developed, and the group is reimbursed by the city for many of the services it provides. Further, the city pays the center to train its social workers. Its building, owned by the city, was given to the group rent free for three years in exchange for its interior renovation while the city paid for its exterior. Such flexible arrangements allow Łódź to take advantage of the expertise and services the shelter provides without alienating other groups (e.g., a Catholic-run shelter for women and children that exists in the city), without creating undue competition among the various women's groups, and without opening itself to the political scrutiny involved in a formal, exclusive contract.

The shelter has had some patronage links with national politicians as well. When Łódź politician Leszek Miller was the minister of labor, the group received money for some of its renovations from the ministry under a very broad interpretation of the shelter's mission (helping women reintegrate into the workplace). The money was funneled through regional-level government. Thus, the funding relationship between the shelter and regional government was actually the result of Miller's patronage.[72]

69. Interviews with Paweł Osiborski, director of the Łódź Department of Social Assistance; Witold Rosset, Mayor Czekalskiąs's press secretary; and Jacek Lelonkiewicz, director of the Hostel for Mothers and Children Protecting Themselves Against Violence, the group that runs Łódź's shelter, fall 1996 and spring 1997.
70. The city maintains a shelter for homeless women and their children, but a stay there cannot exceed 14 days.
71. Interviews with Osiborski, Lelonkiewicz.
72. Interview with Lelonkiewicz.

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Patronage and Service Provision

In Łódź, institutional spaces devoted to women evolved differently than in Kraków. In Kraków, former opposition activists and sympathizers espousing traditional Catholic mores have a virtual monopoly over city politics and agencies. Łódź's more diverse ideological spectrum prevented Catholic mores from becoming translated into public policy. In fact, political polarization prevented the single-minded pursuit of any single means of providing service. Pre-existing connections between the state and quasi-public organizations as well as less formal and flexible links between the city and a wide range of organizations were allowed to flourish. These, in turn, allow the city to tap into a diverse set of organizations and services.

Łódź's de facto shelter provides a high quality of services—the city actually uses the shelter to train its own social workers in dealing with women in crisis. Rather than members of the clergy, the shelter is staffed solely by psychologists, social workers, healthcare professionals, and lawyers. Upon entry to the hostel, every woman is assigned a permanent social worker and is offered medical treatment for any injuries. She is also questioned about any possible contagious diseases she or her children might have (so as not to endanger other residents). The social worker, who becomes the women's direct caretaker during her stay, then conducts an interview in which the women's financial and living situation is assessed. The social worker then presents the client with a pro-active work plan for her stay in the hostel (which can last up to two months but is frequently extended until a woman can afford other living arrangements).

When I went to see the director of the Department of Social Services, Pawel Osiborski, I was encouraged to visit the shelter and was told that a longer-term, contractual relationship with the shelter was being considered. When I asked Osiborski how the city had decided to work with this particular organization, he said that it was really the only choice. While this may be true in terms of the range and professionalization of the services provided, other choices actually do exist in Łódź. For example, the Brothers of St. Albert have a shelter for women and children, and there is also

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the Foundation for the Protection of Children Against Violence. There is also a local chapter of Caritas that could have been coopted as it was in Kraków. Yet, unlike Kraków, the city has not pursued a formal, exclusive relationship with any of these groups for this purpose.

Unlike the situation in Kraków, therefore, Łódź has not alienated a large part of the domestic violence or women's community. While activists are frustrated by the lack of cohesion found among elected officials, there is often relief to be found in the city bureaucracy, which is remarkably well run and efficient in light of the political battles that characterize electoral politics in the city.

Leninist Legacies and Service Provision

The general pattern observed in the area of domestic service provision speaks to several overlooked, positive aspects of what Jowitt called the "Leninist legacies" of institutional chaos, bureaucratic inefficiency, and centralized political control.[73] My research has shown that institutional chaos and bureaucratic inefficiency have created opportunities for new forms of public-sector/third-sector partnership to emerge and that centralized political control has yielded, in Łódź at least, to political competition and pluralism. It can be argued that bureaucratic inefficiency in Poland was a convenient tool to defy state policy and, now "that the state is theirs," Polish bureaucrats are no more inefficient than bureaucrats anywhere.[74] In fact, in both cities I found professionalized, independent bureaucracies that maintain their own, *decentralized* means of accomplishing their agendas, i.e., links to third-sector organizations. While some of these organizations, namely those that existed before 1989 and were sanctioned by state-socialist regimes, are widely criticized by champions of civil society as "in-

73. Kenneth Jowitt, *New World Disorder: The Leninist Extinction* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992).
74. Following Robert D. Putnam, *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993), I tested the "bureaucratic efficiency" of my two cities. I received written responses to inquiries about how to start my own business from each city within 10 days. Requests about how to become involved in newly forming parent-teacher-student councils were not so forthcoming, however. I received no answer from either city.

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authentic" or "manufactured" by the state, in many places, particularly in rural areas, they are one among the very few options available for serving people's needs. These organizations possess such resources as offices, client lists, rapport with clients, experienced personnel, and so forth that cannot be developed by an independent third sector or mobilized by new regimes overnight.

Second, the possible virtues of patronage politics have been overlooked. In a situation where there are few truly independent sources of third-sector organization, political patrons represent a valuable source of organizational initiative, funding, and maintenance. In a politically volatile climate such that in Łódź, patronage is not necessarily a direct exchange of political favors, such as support of one's organization, for votes. Rather, it is a means for political elites to shore up their legitimacy with third-sector elites and to extend tangible support to specific issue-based constituencies.

The Postcommunist Social Service Economy

Finally, I would argue that a large part of the political economy in Łódź is itself built upon social service provision. The city is home to a rather distinguished medical academy and one of the largest medical facilities in all of Poland—the Mother of Poland Hospital—specializing in gynecology and obstetrics. Many Solidarity activists and post-1990 political elites were drawn from the ranks of health-care workers and medical student in Łódź. The preponderance of working women in Łódź, both in the factory and in the public sector, their lower wages, and the resulting greater social needs of their children explain why such a political economy has developed. The Łódź bureaucracy, both at the city and vovoidship (provincial) levels, its pre-existing welfare agencies and charities, and now, its burgeoning third sector have emerged to fill these needs in the postcommunist era.

So, if there is a silver lining to the cloud of the Leninist legacy, it is found in Łódź in the area of service provision. While Kraków has rushed to decentralize and privatize many medical and social services, it has also become extremely dependent upon parish-run charities. Łódź has developed a different model, one more ap-

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propriate to its more leftist, centralized, and patronage-oriented political culture.

Cinderella Seeks Shelter: Will the State, Church or Civil Society Provide?

New institutions linking state and society in postcommunist Poland allow different service options for women who are victims of domestic violence. In Kraków, a highly organized, plural civil society coupled with a strongly Catholic ideological orientation led the city away from its partnership with independent feminist organizations and encouraged a Catholic organization to expand into a wholly new area of service provision. Bureaucratic autonomy and political patronage, on the otherhand, enable Łódź to tap into a wide array of third-sector resources and organizations devoted to improving women's lives.

My research shows that when Polish women seek shelter, no corporatist fairy godmother has institutionalized woman-centered decision spaces. The state (and hence state-policy makers) view women as clients whose menu of "services" is determined by religious belief and political expediency rather than as active citizens with political and social rights guaranteed by the state. This is not to say that the state handles other needy populations (alcoholic or homeless men, for example) as active, empowered citizens. Indeed, the tendencies to treat recipients of social services as passive clients and to select third-sector partners along ideological lines are more likely the rule than the exception.

Simply, economically and politically disempowered "clients" are not seen by policy makers as plum constituents. Moreover, social welfare issues do not present political elites with incentives to build more discursive, corporatist relationships with social service providers and/or women's organizations. Rather, a more ad hoc pattern of associating with these groups seems to the norm. In Kraków, treating women's organizations as if they were expendable damaged city relations with these groups, and further limits future state performance in women's issues by denying the state the expertise of feminist organizations. As a result, feminist organizations expend their precious resources circumventing the

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state. In Łódź, on the other hand, more flexible, but still ad hoc relations between the state and third-sector organizations have proven to be an asset allowing the city to develop variable relations with numerous groups and to profit from the resources and expertise of many of them.

No Fairy Godmothers

In conclusion, Einhorn was right in predicting that democratization is not a Cinderella story for the women of Central Eastern Europe. Poland's transition from state socialism to market democracy has been a mixed bag of benefits and deficits for women in abusive relationships. Certainly, there is a greater recognition of domestic violence as a serious and pervasive social problem that the state must be prepared to address in law, social service provision, etc. In some cases, larger cities especially, the treatment options and legal remedies for women who are victims of domestic violence have expanded. At the same time, "women's issues" are often reinterpreted as "family issues" and women's rights are often seen as coming at the expense of family life. The challenge of translating abstract conceptions like rights into social service entitlements has been foisted upon local governments. Thus, the content of citizenship, especially women's citizenship, is locally determined.

Einhorn was correct in suggesting that women's increasing personal autonomy and social status cannot be accomplished from above but must result from a grass-roots feminist struggle. However, local governments can facilitate or impede this process by conferring or denying patronage to specific third-sector organizations.

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